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The Three Nations of North America? National Character, Regional Culture, and the Values of Canadians and Americans

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ABSTRACT

This paper brings together two related but distinct issues in the analysis of culture and values in Canada and the United States. The first of these is Lipset's well-known thesis on the differences in national character and belief systems between Canadians and Americans. The second issue is the purported existence of distinct regional cultures within both countries. Using national sample survey data, we assess the extent of both cross-national and regional differences on a range of attitudes and perceptions. The results indicate that the pattern of regional cultures in North America (excluding Mexico and Central America) is not significantly affected or defined by the national border separating Canada and the United States. Instead, hierarchical tests of several different models suggest that, with a few exceptions, the map of regional cultures involves three major segments: a relatively left-liberal Quebec, a more conservative southern United States, and a comparatively moderate sector that largely encompasses the remainder of the two countries. The implications for Lipset's thesis on Canadian-American differences, and for the analysis of regional distinctions in both nations, are briefly discussed.

INTRODUCTION

Questions of national character and regional culture have long been of interest to both Canadian and American social scientists. In Canada, an extensive body of research and conjecture has developed around these issues. Much of this work focuses on the tensions that may have arisen between the regional and national identities of the Canadian populace. A major concern in the Canadian literature has been to understand the historical and structural factors behind the development of regional allegiances and rivalries, and the role that regionalism, in turn, may have played in undermining the existence of a truly national Canadian character or ethos (e.g., Schwartz 1974; Simeon and Elkins 1974; Simeon 1975; McCready and Winn 1976; Pammett 1976; Bell and Tepperman 1979; Marsden and Harvey 1979; Grabb 1979; Gibbins 1982; Matthews 1983; Coffey and Polese 1987; Curtis and Tepperman 1990).

In the United States, concerns over the fragmenting effects of regional distinctions seem to have been less pronounced, perhaps because it is widely accepted that the American national identity and national vision are sufficiently well-defined and established to override the effects of regional divisions. Even so, many observers have suggested that, in the United States as well, there exist important and deep-seated differences in regional culture, because of a range of historical, geographic, demographic, and related forces (e.g., Odum 1936; Odum and Moore 1938; Sealy and Rees 1968; Thoman 1978; Zelinsky 1973; Gastil 1975; Garreau 1981; Kahle 1983, 1986). Therefore, there is reason to inquire into the degree to which the persistence of regional cultures and affiliations may have complicated the task of identifying and comprehending a singular national character or value system among Americans.

The recognition of regional divisions in both Canada and the United States clearly raises important questions for those who seek to characterize the value differences between the two peoples. It is surprising, then, that little or no empirical work has been conducted that considers or controls for regional divisions when assessing Canadian and American value differences. For example, the best-known researcher in the field, Seymour Martin Lipset, has written widely on the ways in which Canadians and American are said to diverge on a range of values, beliefs, and perceptions; nevertheless, virtually none of his analyses has considered the implications for his thesis of possible regional divergences in values within the two nations (e.g., Lipset 1963a, 1963b, 1964, 1968, 1985, 1986, 1990). One possible exception occurs in some of Lipset's more recent writings, where he briefly deals with the distinction between French and English Canadians when assessing value differences. Nevertheless, even this work represents only an indirect assessment of one regional division: between Quebec and the rest of Canada.[2]

It is difficult, in fact, to find any researcher who has simultaneously considered regional divisions when assessing the value differences between Canadians and Americans. One study by Kahle (1986) did explore whether the North American continent is divisible into nine distinct "nations," or cultural regions, along lines suggested by Garreau (1981). However, this study was concerned only with determining if the nine nations model was superior to the conventional U.S. Census classification for identifying distinct regions in the United States.

Issues surrounding Canadian and American value differences, as well as the impact of regionalism on these differences, were not addressed.

The purpose of the present paper is to extend our knowledge in this area, by placing the discussions of both national value differences and internal regional distinctiveness in the same theoretical and empirical contexts. In so doing, we seek to determine if current Canadian and American discussions of national character, on the one hand, and of regional culture, on the other hand, can expand our understanding of both international and intranational differences in values and attitudes. We begin with a brief review of Lipset's general thesis on the value differences between Canadians and Americans. We then reconsider the question of Canadian and American differences, this time with evidence that takes into account regional divisions in the two countries. In the latter case, we examine the case for value differences using alternative models for mapping geographical divisions in Canada and the United States, including some models that group together regions that span the official border separating the two nations.

THE LIPSET THESIS

Lipset's basic argument is that Canadians and Americans embrace significantly different sets of values, primarily because the two nations grew out of different origins and founding premises. The United States is said to be a product of liberal democratic revolution and, in its modern form, evinces an individualist, equalitarian, and universalist value system that is wholly in keeping with such beginnings. Canada, however, is portrayed as originating from a counterrevolutionary rejection of these same values and a commitment to the opposite ideals of collectivism, particularism, elitism, and acceptance of established authority. Though Lipset acknowledges that Canada has since become a liberal democracy and now displays many similarities with the United States, he insists that the distinct origins of the two countries continue to shape the nature and trajectory of the belief systems in the two societies, with "no consistent decline in the patterns of differences in behaviour and values" (1986, p.146; see also 1985, p.156, 1990, p.212).

As has been noted in some critiques of Lipset's work, it is often difficult to know exactly what his thesis would predict regarding the actual direction of differences we should find between Canadians and Americans on specific questions or issues (Baer et al. 1990a, 1990b, 1990c). Nevertheless, the general themes developed in most of Lipset's writings suggest that Americans are more "classically liberal, Whig, individualistic, antistatist, [and] populist" than Canadians (Lipset 1990, p.212). In other words, relative to Canadians, Americans should be more likely to prefer equality of opportunity (though not equality of condition); to distrust or dislike both centralized authority and collectivist policies in government and private business; to oppose the granting of special rights or privileges to particular interest groups; and to harbour a progressive or non-traditional orientation toward a range of institutions operating within the legal system, the family structure, and elsewhere.

THE EXISTENCE OF REGIONAL CULTURES

To characterize the value differences that exist between two entire nations is no simple task. This task becomes even more complicated when some heed is paid to the potential internal divisions within the nations in question. Canada is widely seen as a country with important and longstanding regional cleavages, so much so that many observers have questioned and even despaired over the prospects for its future existence as a nation (e.g., Grant 1965). The precise nature of Canada's internal divisions is a matter of some debate but, at a minimum, observers typically divide the country into five geographic areas or cultural communities: the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie Provinces, and British Columbia. The Northern territories are sometimes treated as an additional regional category.

Apart from these principal distinctions, observers occasionally advocate the need for further delineation; for example, researchers sometimes divide Newfoundland from the rest of the Atlantic Provinces, and it is occasionally suggested that Alberta should be considered separately from the other Prairie Provinces. There are also those who believe that, in any analysis of regional cultures, a clear distinction should be made between the northern and southern segments of most regions, as in the split between northern and southern Ontario, for example. A somewhat related view is that we should always recognize the pronounced differences between the urban and rural populations in each of the major regions.

Some observers of the United States have also pointed to distinct regional cultures, in spite of the unified and homogeneous image of American society that is usually presented. For a variety of reasons, complete agreement on which regions should be distinguished is perhaps more difficult to obtain in the American than in the Canadian case. Difficulties arise, in particular, because of the much greater size and density of the American population; the greater political complexity of the United States, with its fifty state jurisdictions and myriad municipal governments; and the considerable diversity and interconnectedness of the vastly larger American economy.

Despite these complications, several attempts have been made to identify America's major regional cultures or communities. The classification of regions developed by the U.S. Census Bureau is probably the most widely known. However, the Census classification is not universally employed or accepted by those working on the topic.[3] Over the years, various researchers in the United States have attempted to devise their own categorizations (e.g., Odum 1936; Odum and Moore 1938; Bogue and Beale 1960; Zelinsky 1973; Garreau 1981; for an overview, see Gastil 1975). Most researchers and commentators seem to agree on certain basic distinctions that are also congruent with the U.S. Census scheme. For example, like the Census categorization, virtually all other classifications separate the North and the South, and also recognize the West and the Middle (or Midwest) states as distinct regions.

The present analysis reports findings for the United States using one of these classifications: the categorization first devised by Odum (1936). This classification, which is described in more detail in the Data and Methods section of the paper, is similar to the conventional U.S. Census approach in its basic regional distinctions. However, it has

some advantages over both the Census categories and the formulations proposed by other researchers. The key advantage is that Odum's classification enables us to assess several different regional models, including one that transcends the official border separating Canada and the United States. The latter model tests what we shall refer to as the "proximity hypothesis." This hypothesis suggests that Canadians and Americans residing in contiguous regions share many of the same beliefs and perceptions, as a result of living in areas that, despite the border between them, typically have similar economic bases, climates, topographies, ethnic compositions, historical patterns of settlement, and so on. As an illustration, it is conceivable that, in regard to their values and attitudes, Americans living in the Midwestern states are actually more similar to their Canadian neighbours in the adjoining Prairie Provinces than they are to other Americans. The same argument can be made for similarities between Canadians in British Columbia and nearby Americans on the U.S. West coast, between Atlantic Canadians and New England Americans, and so on.

If such regional affinities are revealed in the present analysis, they would represent a serious challenge to Lipset's overall thesis on the value differences between Canadians and Americans; that is, such findings would suggest that identifiable regional cultures can actually override official political borders and, hence, may be more significant than nationality for shaping the value systems of both peoples. On the other hand, if we find that the formal boundaries do matter, and that important value differences exist between Canadians and Americans, even when they are relatively close geographic neighbours, then Lipset's claims for the enduring influence of national differences in values would be strengthened. Through the use of hierarchical tests, we can also compare the fit of the "proximity" model with several other models of regional distinctiveness, including Lipset's simple division of North America into two basic segments (Canada versus the United States). We move now to a description of the data and methods that have been used to assess these questions in the present study.

DATA AND METHODS

For the analysis undertaken here, data were obtained from the merged multi-nation file of the Class Structure and Class Consciousness Study obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (I.C.P.S.R.). The Canadian data were collected in 1982-83, the U.S. data in 1980.[4] In both countries, the universe consisted of adults, 18 years and older, who were working at the time of the interview. In Canada, 1785 labor force participants were interviewed; in the United States, the sample size for employed individuals was 1498. A separate sample of housewives with working spouses and unemployed individuals was also obtained in each country. The latter samples were not as directly comparable as the labor force samples, and so were not used in the analysis.

The full surveys administered in the two countries were not identical, but in each country a set of core items common to both countries was included. Many of these items are appropriate for our purposes, because they draw from content domains similar to those considered by Lipset and others working on the question of Canadian-American value differences. Based on their face validity, we chose a

range of items dealing with five general issue areas: 1) perceptions of corporate power and profits, combined with attitudes regarding government social services spending and economic inequality, 2) alternative or radical orientations to the capitalist organization of society, 3) attitudes about labor and unions, 4) beliefs about gender inequality, and 5) attitudes about family discipline and social control, especially in relation to crime. In all cases, items were coded so that lower scores represent what might be referred to as more "progressive" or "left-liberal" orientations: opposition to corporations and inequality, support for alternatives to the existing social order, for labor, and for women's rights, and opposition to more discipline and control.

The regional groupings used in the analysis are as follows. For Canada, we used a six-category scheme: the Atlantic Provinces (N=143), Quebec (N=452), Ontario (N=551), Manitoba/Saskatchewan (N=188), Alberta (N=159), and British Columbia (N=175). This categorization is similar to the standard scheme used by most researchers, except for the separation of Alberta from the other two Prairie Provinces. Because the Alberta sub-sample was sufficiently large to make this distinction, and because Alberta is commonly seen as more conservative socially and politically than the rest of the Prairies, we chose to treat Alberta as a distinct region.[5]

As noted in the introduction, respondents in the United States were grouped into six regions, following a classification originally proposed by Odum (1936): (1) the Far West (N=141) included Washington, Oregon, California, and Nevada; (2) the North West (N=49) comprised Montana, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; (3) the Middle region (N=285) consisted of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio; (4) the North East (N=285) included Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia; (5) the South West (N=113) included Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona; and (6) the South East (N=274), which we have called the "Old South," included Kentucky, Virginia, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Florida.[6]

The Odum classification, though similar to the conventional U.S. Census approach in most respects, has several advantages. First, its six categories enable us to check for more detailed regional distinctions than is possible using the four- or five-category versions of the U.S. Census approach. Second, Odum's classification does not reduce the sample sizes within regions to unacceptably low levels, a problem that arises with the more detailed nine-category Census scheme.[7] Third, as noted previously, Odum's approach divides the United States in a way that allows us to test several different models of regional culture, especially the proximity model mentioned in the introduction. We are also able to compare the fit of this model with the fit of several other models.[8] Throughout the analysis, we employed a latent variable model for purposes of (1) constructing a confirmatory factor analysis model across each of the twelve regional groupings, and (2) analysing factor mean differences. LISREL VII was used to generate parameter estimates for this model. A common factor loading matrix (the LISREL "LY" matrix) was imposed on all twelve regional categories; that is, equivalent

factor loading parameters were constrained to equality across regions. Factor mean differences were estimated by setting measurement equation intercept vectors (Lisrel "tau-y" vectors) to equality across regions but freeing structural equation intercepts (Lisrel "alpha" vectors). For latent variable means, an identifying restriction must be imposed, and in our model this took the form of setting the value of the factor mean to zero for one region (the reference group). All latent variable mean vectors thus represent differences between the factor mean for any region in question and the factor mean for the reference region, which in this analysis is Ontario. The selection of Ontario was arbitrary, but the use of a different reference group would not have altered the estimated magnitude of differences between regions (although the actual coefficients, of course, would have changed).

The attitude items used to construct our latent variables were, with a few exceptions, measured using four-point agree-disagree response scales, so that the range between minimum and maximum values was three points. Since we fixed the variances of the latent variables using reference indicators, the latent variables are scaled in the same metric as the indicators. Factor mean differences can be interpreted as movement along a four-point scale, with a difference of .5 representing half the distance from an "agree somewhat" to a "disagree somewhat" response.

To extend our analysis, we assessed the mean differences after the application of statistical controls for education, income, age, gender, and size of community of residence.[8] Technically, this procedure was accomplished through the introduction of exogenous x-variables into the model. A matrix of regression coefficients (the Lisrel "gamma" matrix) linking these exogenous variables with the five endogenous value domain constructs was estimated in each of the twelve regions. Since we sought to assess mean differences, we constrained this matrix to equality across regions. We converted income into U.S. dollars, and then took the natural logarithm of this value. Age was measured in years and education in years of schooling. Gender was simply coded as males=1, females=0. No measure was available for respondent's current community of residence. Instead, a measure of the size of the respondent's community of residence at age 16 was used to control for possible rural-urban differences; it was coded as: rural=1, city or town under 50,000=2, city between 50,000 and 250,000=3, and city over 250,000=4.[10]

RESULTS

(i) The Factor Pattern and Correlations Among Constructs

The items and their standardized factor loadings are shown in Table 1. First, we should note that two dimensions that might initially appear to be theoretically separate have been combined in the analysis: attitudes concerning corporate profits and attitudes dealing with economic inequality and government social services spending. This combination is consistent previous research (Baer et al. 1990a), indicating a sufficiently high correlation between the two dimensions in these data that they can reasonably be treated as one dimension in both countries.

As outlined above, we constructed twelve regional groupings for the analysis. The factor solution shown in Table 1 is a common solution imposed across all regions. For most items and most constructs, this

Table 1

Item Wording	Factor Loading (standardized in brackets)
Corporations/Inequality	
1. Corporations benefit owners at the expense of workers and consumers.	1.010 (.471)
2. Big corporations have far too much power in [American] [Canadian] society today.	1.000* (.509)
3. One of the main reasons for poverty is that the economy is based on private ownership and profits	1.395 (.603)
4. Many people in [the United States][Canada] receive much less income than they deserve.	.854 (.396)
5. Government social spending on services like education and health: "Do you think that the government should be spending a great deal more, somewhat more, the present amount, somewhat less or a great deal less."	.878 (.423)
Alternative/Radical Consciousness	
6. In any industrial society it will always be necessary to have a division between those experts who make decisions and people who carry out these decisions.	-.232 (-.132)
7. It is possible for a modern society to run effectively without the profit motive.	.960 (.503)
8. If given the chance, the nonmanagement employees at the place where you work could run things effectively without bosses.	1.000* (.451)
Labor	
9. During a Strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of strikers.	1.000* (.721)
10. Striking workers are generally justified in physically preventing strikebreakers from entering the place of work.	.658 (.544)
11. Imagine the workers in a major industry are out on strike over working conditions and wages. Which of the following would you like to see: (1) the workers win their most important demands, (2) the workers win some of their demands and make some concessions (3), the workers win only a few of their demands and make major concessions, (4) the workers go back to work without winning any of their demands.	.290 (.412)

Table 1 cont'd.

Gender Equality	
12. It is better for the family if the husband is the principal breadwiner outside the home and the wife has primary responsibility for the home and children.	-.325 (-.249)
13. If both husband and wife work, they should share equally in the housework and child care.	.217 (.293)
14. There are not enough women in responsible positions in government and private business.	.690 (.685)
15. Ideally, there should be as many women as men in important positions in government and business.	1.000* (.846)
Control and Family Discipline	
12. [see wording above]	-.726 (-.373)
16. In order to reduce crime, the courts should give criminals stiffer punishments.	-.840 (-.484)
17. If parents disciplined their children more firmly, there would be less crime.	-1.000* (-.532)

*reference indicator

"across group constraint" works well, but in a few instances there is evidence that the common measurement model cannot as easily be applied to all regions. With a common factor model, that is, with factor loading parameters constrained to equality across all regions, the goodness of fit indices are as follows: Ontario .960; Quebec .936; Atlantic Provinces .893; Manitoba/Saskatchewan .893; Alberta .896; British Columbia .897; U.S. Far West .882; U.S. North West .778; U.S. Middle .931; U.S. North East .920, U.S. South West .866, and U.S. Old South .921. The overall chi-square for the model is 2193.46 (df=1493). Most of the lower goodness of fit index values are located in the smaller regions, where the fitting of additional parameters to improve the fit of the model might capitalize on chance. Across the entire model, no correlated error terms are estimated.[11] The release of the across-region equality constraints, combined with the use of the same factor pattern in each region, results in a model with only a slightly better fit (chi-square=1959.45, df=1296; goodness of fit indices typically increasing by .010).[12]

The constructs dealing with corporations/inequality, alternative/radical consciousness, and labor are fairly highly correlated. With construct variances and covariances standardized across regions, the correlations are .742 (alternative/radical with corporations/inequality), .682 (corporations/inequality with labor) and .531 (alternative/radical with labor). Correlations among these items are consistently high in all twelve regions. With correlations this high, the construction of a second-order factor encompassing all three dimensions would not have been out of the question. However, this procedure would have added to the complexity of an already extensive model and, as will be shown below, regional differences in factor means were not always consistent across the three constructs in any case.

Other correlations tend to be substantially lower. The coefficient linking the corporations/inequality construct with the gender equality factor is .384; that is, individuals who support equality for women also support equality in general and tend to agree that corporations are too powerful, that corporations benefit owners at the expense of consumers and workers, and that there is too much difference between rich and poor. The same linkage between positions on gender equality and alternative/radical consciousness (.276) and support for labor (.263) can also be found across the entire combined sample. In individual regions, these coefficients are in the same direction and also tend to be similar in strength.

Across the twelve regions, the difference in the chi-square model fit statistic, between a model where the factor variance-covariance matrix is constrained to equality and one where the matrix is allowed to differ in each region, only slightly exceeds the difference in the number of degrees of freedom (chi-square=205.5, df=165, $p<.017$); much of this disparity can be attributed to differences in factor variances rather than covariances between factors.

There is a slight correlation between opposing control/ family discipline and supporting both alternative/radical consciousness (.209) and gender equality (.172). Because of the large pooled sample size, all of these correlations are significant at $p<.01$. The association between support for labor and support for gender equality (.159 across all regions) is lower in Ontario (.097), the U.S. Far West (.014), and the U.S. South West (.097), but higher in the Atlantic Provinces (.288) and

the U.S. Middle (.256). The differences between these coefficients and the overall values, constrained across regions, are all significant at $p<.01$. It is already apparent that the picture emerging from both the factor pattern and the correlations among constructs is certainly not one of clear and simple Canada-U.S. differences.

(ii) Factor Mean Comparisons

Table 2 presents the estimated factor mean differences, without controls, for each of the five constructs in the analysis. For the corporations/inequality construct, there is very little difference across regions, either within Canada, within the United States, or between Canada and the United States. However, it does appear that, in two geographically contiguous regions, the Canadian Atlantic Provinces and the U.S. North East, respondents tend to be more supportive of redistributive social policies than in the other regions. The regional variability for the alternative/radical consciousness construct is considerably higher in Canada than it is in the United States. While scores for Ontario are similar to those found in most U.S. regions, residents of Quebec, the Atlantic Provinces, and British Columbia are all more likely to agree that it is possible to imagine a society "without the profit motive." There is no significant difference between Ontario and any of the U.S. regions, except the U.S. Middle, and this single difference is smaller than the differences between Ontario and each of the other Canadian regions.

Within Canada, there is less sympathy for labor unions in strike situations in both Manitoba/Saskatchewan and Alberta than there is in the rest of Canada. While support for labor is generally lower in the United States than in Canada, differences between Ontario and the American regions are significant only for the U.S. South West and the U.S. Old South. Interestingly, antipathy toward unions in strike situations is higher in the three Canadian Prairie Provinces than it is in both the U.S. South West and U.S Old South. This finding is especially surprising in the case of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where the labor-oriented New Democratic Party has received considerable support, and where it has at times formed the provincial government. At the time of the Canadian survey, however, political support for the N.D.P. had declined in these regions, and the decline might account for this result. The lesser sympathy for labor in Alberta may not be surprising, given its rejection of the N.D.P. and its generally conservative political orientation historically (e.g., Lipset 1950; Macpherson 1953).

As might be expected, more traditional values regarding control and family discipline are evident in the U.S. Old South, with respondents from this region more in favour of stiff punishment for criminals and strict child-rearing. Also apparent is the difference between Quebec respondents and those in the rest of Canada and the United States: there is a clear tendency for Quebeckers to be more opposed than other people to these traditional views, as reflected in the size of the coefficient (-.443). This coefficient drops somewhat with controls (-.252), but is still large. It is also evident that, on the control/family discipline construct, little if any difference exists among the English-Canadian regions, the U.S. Far West, the U.S. North East, and the U.S. South West.

Table 2

Factor Mean Comparisons, with and without controls

Variables:
CORP/INEQ. Corporations,profits, inequality. High score = disagree corporations have too much power, support inequality, oppose social services spending.

ALTERN. Alternative/radical. High score = disagree that nonmanagers can run things, agree that experts/managers are necessary.

LABOR. Support for labour. High score = disagree strikebreakers should not be allowed, hope workers win "none of their demands" in labour disputes

CONTROL/FAMILY. Family discipline. High score = agree with statement that crime can be solved with stiffer punishments, more family discipline.

GENDER EQ. Gender equality. High score = disagree with statements calling for equality in workplace.

Region	CORP./INEQ.	ALTERN.	LABOR	CONTROL/FAM.	GENDER EQ.
Ontario	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*
Quebec	-.068 (-.044)	-.285## (-.242##)	-.118 (-.083)	-.443## (-.252##)	-.217## (-.213##)
Atlantic Provinces	-.158# (-.128#)	-.160# (-.119)	-.086 (-.069)	+.014 (-.028)	+.002 (-.050)
Manitoba/Sask.	-.073 (-.035)	-.130# (-.079)	+.352## (+.368##)	+.026 (-.031)	+.008 (-.033)
Alberta	+.021 (+.044)	+.060 (+.107)	+.394## (+.398##)	+.149# (+.081)	+.119 (+.098)
British Columbia	-.079 (-.073)	-.267## (-.249##)	-.093 (-.060)	+.010 (-.027)	-.050 (-.078)
U.S. Far West	-.062 (-.038)	-.070 (-.045)	+.124 (+.136)	-.002 (+.089)	+.063 (+.108)
U.S. North West	+.084 (+.076)	-.090 (-.085)	+.138 (+.104)	+.180 (+.162)	+.236 (+.195)
U.S. Middle	-.057 (-.041)	-.125# (-.109)	+.052 (+.058)	+.044 (+092#)	+.211# (+.211#)
U.S. North East	-.096# (-.101#)	-.093 (-.102)	+.014 (-.001)	+.010 (+.061)	-.051 (-.039)
U.S. South West	+.034 (+.022)	+.017 (+.041)	+.267# (+.235#)	+.093 (+.158#)	-.019 (-.017)
U.S. Old South	-.015 (-.002)	-.038 (-.007)	+.219# (+.210#)	+.227## (+.214##)	+.307## (+.264##)

 # significantly different from reference group at p<.05 or ## p<.001.
*** reference group**
Numbers in brackets refer to mean differences with controls for age, income, education, gender and urban/rural.

A similar pattern can be seen with respect to the gender equality construct. Quebeckers are significantly more likely to support gender equality, while individuals from the U.S. Old South, the U.S. Middle, and probably the U.S. North West[13] are significantly less likely to endorse gender equality than are individuals from the English regions of Canada and the United States. As with the control/family discipline construct, there are few differences among the English-Canadian regions (except Alberta) and among the U.S. regions (except the U.S. Old South and possibly the U.S. North West).

The results to this point indicate no strong cross-national differences that would identify the Canada-U.S. border as an important cultural boundary. Other findings also question the border's utility as a line separating people with markedly distinct belief systems. Earlier research has suggested that, contrary to Lipset's view of Canadians as more traditional than Americans, Canadians are, for example, actually less supportive of family discipline and more supportive of gender equality than are Americans (Baer et al. 1990a). The regional breakdowns in this analysis now indicate that this difference is not, strictly speaking, a national difference. Instead, the supposed national difference stems primarily from the existence of a relatively more traditional U.S. Old South (and occasionally the U.S. Middle region) and a Quebec that is significantly less traditional than all of the other regions. In other words, the attitudes of English Canadians and those Americans living outside the Old South are, on average, very similar on these issues. These findings contradict Lipset's claim that English Canadians are more traditional or conservative than Americans; at the same time, they provide an important clarification of where the major cultural divisions on the continent should probably be drawn.

(iii) Hierarchical Tests of Different Regional Models

A set of hierarchical tests was performed to determine the extent to which regions might be considered to be different across the five attitudinal constructs. These tests, which are summarized in Table 3, are affected by the fact that three of the five constructs deal with political economy issues, although regional factor mean differences for these three constructs (corporations/inequality, alternative/radical consciousness, and labor) are not always consistent (see Table 2).

If we compare Model I, in which each of the five factor means is allowed to differ across each of the twelve regions, with another model in which each of the means are constrained to equality across all twelve regions, the overall chi-square difference is 375.93 (df=55). We can now test the fit of Model II, Lipset's simple two-nations model, by constraining means to equality within countries but allowing between-country differences. Such a model accounts for a relatively small proportion of the overall difference (the chi-square difference is 70.74, df=5). This difference is statistically significant, but an inspection of Table 2 suggests that much of the overall Canada-U.S. difference is probably attributable to the difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada and the United States, combined. When the Quebec means are allowed to differ from the other Canadian regions (Model III), which in effect creates a three-category model involving Quebec, English Canada, and the United States, the chi-square value improves by 174.97 (df=5).

There is also a further improvement when the U.S. Old South is separated from the rest of the United States (Model IV); this distinction improves the chi-square by 26.29 (df=5, p<.001). When this model is modified to combine (or estimate common parameters for) English Canada and all U.S. regions except the U.S. Old South, the decrease in the chi-square value is not statistically significant (chi-square=5.27, df=5, p<.382). The latter result implies that differences between English Canada and the U.S., apart from the U.S. Old South, are very small. These findings suggest that Model V, or what might be called a "three-nations model" of North America, captures most of the regional variation in attitudes. That is, the three major political cultural sectors within the geographic bounds of the two countries are: Quebec, the U.S. Old South, and the rest of both Canada and the United States.

The comparisons just described involve factor mean differences without controls but, as shown in Table 3, very similar results obtain even when exogenous (control) variables are included in the models. With controls, the difference between a model that separates English Canada from the United States (excluding the Old South) and a model that combines the two together is now statistically significant (chi-square=34.94, df=5, p<.001), but the difference is substantively quite small.

At least in terms of factor mean differences, then, we can explain most regional variation in attitudes and beliefs by grouping all of the regions into three major categories. As is implied by the hierarchical tests described above, of the chi-square difference of 375.93 (representing all possible differences among means in the twelve regions across 55 parameters), 266.73 is accounted for by only 10 parameters in a model that constructs just three regions.

There are some deviations to the "three-nations" model suggested by these results, but most of them can be accounted for by four exception patterns: (1) greater opposition to corporations in the U.S. North East and the Atlantic Provinces (t=2.662), (2) greater opposition to labor in Alberta, Manitoba/Saskatchewan, and the U.S. South West (t=6.456), and (3) greater support for alternative/radical consciousness in British Columbia, the Atlantic Provinces, Manitoba/Saskatchewan, and the U.S. Middle (t=2.971), and (4) greater opposition to gender equality in the U.S. Middle (t=3.536). If these departures from the three-nations model are represented by single parameters (e.g., so that the U.S. North East and the Atlantic Provinces are allowed to differ from the rest of the regions but not from each other), the overall fit of the model improves to account for almost all of the mean differences (see Model VI). Note in Table 3 that the difference between Model VI, with 14 parameters representing mean differences, and Model I, with 55 parameters in which all means are allowed to differ across each group, is not statistically significant (chi-square=40.55, df=41, p<.490).

Similar results obtain when education, income, age, gender, and size of community are entered as exogenous variables into the equations, and factor means are adjusted for the effects of these variables. However, compared to the results without controls, the controlled comparisons do suggest the addition of one extra parameter, representing greater support for the control/family discipline construct outside Ontario, the Atlantic Provinces, and Manitoba/Saskatchewan (t=4.090).[14]

Our initial assumption that Alberta should be separated for analytic purposes from Manitoba/Saskatchewan is not clearly supported at

Table 3

Hierarchical significance tests

Baseline model: all factor means constrained to equality across groups (with controls, chi-square=5399.11, df=2966; without controls, chi-square= 3797.24, df=1978).

Model	Difference from baseline model (df)	Without controls	With controls
Model I			
Factor mean parameters all free	55	375.93	355.38
Model II: Lipset (simple)			
All Canadian regions All U.S. regions	5	70.74	123.20
Model III: Separate Quebec			
All English Canadian regions Quebec All U.S. regions	10	245.71	243.54
Model IV: Separate Quebec, U.S. Old South			
All English Canadian regions Quebec U.S. Old South All U.S. regions exc. Old South	15	272.00	263.14
Model V: 'Three Nations'			
1) Quebec 2) U.S. Old South 3) Rest of Canada and U.S.	10	266.73	234.65
Model VI: Three Nations, with exceptions	14	325.38	298.08
Model VII: 'Proximity' Model			
1) Cdn. Atlantic = U.S. NE 2) Quebec 3) U.S. Old South 4) Ontario = U.S. middle 5) Man/Sask = Alta = U.S. NW 6) B.C. = U.S. Far West	30	328.18	294.39

the level of factor means. The chi-square change between a model in which means for these two regions are constrained to equality and a model in which they are allowed to differ is not statistically significant (chi-square=9.91, df=5, p<.0778 without controls; chi-square=8.97, df=5, p<.1102 with controls. These results are not shown in the tables).

(iv) Testing the Proximity Hypothesis

A central interest in the present analysis is to test the hypothesis that Canadians and Americans living in contiguous regions along the national border might actually be more similar to each other in regard to attitudes and beliefs than to their fellow citizens living in other regions of their respective countries. The means reported in Table 2 provide some supporting evidence for the hypothesis; for example, respondents in the Atlantic Provinces and the U.S. North East are very similar in their attitudes on the corporations/inequality construct, and are more opposed to corporations and inequality than are those living in other regions. A model with "contiguous pairings" was constructed to test the general utility of east-west as opposed to north-south divisions, as a starting point for describing regional variations in the two countries (see Model VII in Table 3). The following groups were defined: (1) British Columbia with the U.S. Far West, (2) Alberta and Manitoba/Saskatchewan with the U.S. North West, (3) Ontario with the U.S. Middle, (4) the Atlantic Provinces with the U.S. North East, (5) the U.S. South West, (6) the U.S. Old South, and (7) Quebec. Means were constrained to equality within groups but allowed to differ among groups. This model involves 30 parameters representing mean differences, and results in a chi-square improvement of 328.18 compared to the baseline model, where all means are constrained to equality across groups. This improvement can be contrasted with a chi-square improvement of 375.93 if all parameters are freed (Model I). With controls, the improvement is similar: of a maximum difference of 355.38, the proximity model improves the value of chi-square by 294.39. No formal comparison of the proximity model and the baseline model is possible, because the two are not nested models; however, in a general sense the comparison between the fit of the proximity model and the fit of the baseline model suggests some support for the proximity hypothesis. Certainly, no damage is done to the fit of the model when adjoining regions that straddle the Canada-U.S. border are collapsed into single categories.

(v) The Effects of Exogenous Variables

In the analysis reported in Table 3, we controlled for the effects of five exogenous variables: education, income, age, gender, and size of community of residence at age 16. In order to accomplish this analysis, it was necessary to impose an equality constraint on the regression coefficients connecting the exogenous variables with the five value domain constructs. In LISREL terminology, this constraint implies a gamma matrix that is invariant across groups. In using this procedure, we provisionally assume that the control variables have the same effects on attitudes across all twelve regions. With these constraints, the pooled effects of the exogenous variables are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Across group standardized regression coefficients for exogenous variables (unstandardized values in brackets)

	CORP./ INEQ.	ALTERN.	LABOR	CONTROL/ FAM.	GENDER EQ.
Education	.236** (.036)	.147** (.026)	.225** (.054)	-.303** (-.042)	-.032(ns) (-.008)
Income	.064* (.035)	.052(ns) (.033)	-.007(ns) (-.006)	-.071(ns) (-.035)	.019(ns) (.018)
Age	.190** (.068)	.240** (.102)	.176** (.101)	.334** (.109)	.141** (.088)
Gender (male=1; female=0)	.158** (.145)	.099* (.107)	.008(ns) (.011)	.136** (.144)	.254** (.402)
Community Size	.038(ns) (.015)	.088* (.040)	-.035(ns) (-.021)	-.105** (-.037)	-.047* (-.031)

* significant at p<.05
** significant at p<.001

Higher score on dependent variables implies: a) support for corporations/inequality, b) opposition to alternative/radical views, c) opposition to labour, d) support for more family discipline, punishment, e) opposition to gender equality.

Across regions, education tends to be associated with less opposition to corporations and inequality, less support for alternative/radical views of society, and less support for labor. Curiously, education has no consistent, statistically significant, effect on attitudes toward gender equality. However, there is a clear tendency for better educated individuals to oppose more punishment for criminals or more family discipline as effective means for reducing crime. As might be expected, older people are generally more traditional or conservative; that is, they are more likely to support family discipline but less likely to oppose corporate power, adopt alternative conceptions of society, support labor, or support gender equality. Males are more conservative than females on all dimensions except the labor construct, where there are no significant differences by gender. While people with urban backgrounds are more left-liberal on gender equality and the control/family discipline domain, community size has relatively little effect on responses to the three political economy constructs, apart from a very slight tendency for non-urbanized respondents support alternative/radical views of society.

We can also assess the extent to which the findings reported in Table 4 differ from region to region, through an analysis of modification indices and estimated parameter chance coefficients. Two concerns are whether institutional processes work differently in the various regions and whether the stratification of values takes on the same pattern everywhere. We are especially interested in determining if such differences are more pronounced in Quebec or the U.S. Old South than elsewhere, given the different factor means we have found for these regions relative to the other regions examined in this analysis.

As it turns out, there are very few patterns of this sort in either Quebec or the U.S Old South. The deviations in the effects of exogenous variables, none of which is shown in the tables, largely involve differences in degree, not direction. In Quebec, which has factor means that are quite different from the overall average, the stratification of attitudes is similar to that found elsewhere, with a few exceptions. Higher income individuals are less likely than lower income respondents to support corporations and inequality in Quebec (coefficient=-.045) but are more supportive in the pooled sample of all groups (see coefficient=.035 in Table 4, t-value of the difference=9.328).[15] The impact of education on attitudes toward labor is considerably weaker in Quebec (.019) than in the pooled sample (.054 in Table 4, t-value of the difference=9.469), although in both cases the more educated display more opposition to labor than do the less educated. The negligible effect of size of residence on gender equality in Quebec (-.001) compared to -.031 for the pooled sample (Table 4), is surprising, since people in Quebec are already more supportive of gender equality than are residents of other regions (see Table 2). We might have expected to see vestiges of the alleged conservatism of rural Quebeckers in these results. Apparently, the move to a more progressive or left-liberal society since the Quiet Revolution has pervaded both rural and urban Quebec, or else the characterization of rural Quebec as inherently traditional and conservative may be subject to question (see Baer and Curtis 1984).

In the U.S. Old South, the influence of income on support for corporations is much stronger (.163) than it is for a pooled model (.035 in Table 4, t-value of the difference=14.465). Also, the effect of community size on alternative/radical consciousness is much more

pronounced (.161) than it is in the pooled sample (.040 in Table 4, t-value of the difference=9.118), although urban individuals in both cases are less likely to support alternatives to the existing social structure. In addition, the strong male-female differences in support for gender equality revealed in other regions (.402 in Table 4) are much weaker in the U.S. Old South (.152, t-value of the difference=5.825); thus, in the Old South, a region where support for gender equality is already weaker than elsewhere, women are found to be less likely than males to support gender equality. Finally, in the U.S. Old South, there is a greater degree of stratification of labor attitudes by age; the coefficient across all regions is .101 (Table 4), while the coefficient for the U.S. Old South is .275 (t-value of the difference=3.185). In other words, there is a stronger relationship between age and opposition to labor in this region. As has already been noted, people in the U.S. Old South are more opposed to labor than are people in most other regions, and this opposition is particularly apparent among older respondents. Interestingly, a similar pattern involving the age variable does not occur in Manitoba/Saskatchewan or Alberta, even though the general populations of these two Canadian regions show even more opposition to labor on average than do people in the U.S. Old South.

Thus, in spite of modest deviations from the overall pattern, there is evidence of a common set of political and social attitudes across most of English Canada and the United States. People from Quebec and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. Old South appear to have cultural orientations that are distinct from each other and from the rest of North America. The deviations from this three-region pattern suggest that, at times, some regional variations persist in regard to the five construct domains we have been able to evaluate in this paper. Our ability to assess the adjoining U.S. states in the U.S. North West is limited by the available sample size, so that we cannot say for certain if similar exceptions exist in portions of the U.S. prairies. For the most part, though, it is arguable that there is no clear and overriding geographic fault line distinguishing English Canadians from Americans, at least in regard to the political and social dimensions we have been able to examine. Most of the differences between the two peoples are substantially accounted for by certain regional distinctions, most notably Quebec and the U.S. Old South, and not by fundamental national differences that would imply within-country homogeneity and between-country divergence.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The analysis has revealed some interesting, and perhaps unexpected, patterns of regional cultural differentiation in Canada and the United States. These patterns call into serious question Lipset's general thesis of Canadian-American value differences. Previous research has suggested that many of Lipset's claims either exaggerate or misspecify the nature of Canadian and American differences (e.g., Crawford and Curtis 1975; Grabb and Curtis 1988; Baer et al. 1990a, 1990b). The present investigation indicates that the entire argument for the existence of distinct national characters in the two countries may require extensive rethinking. Rather than demonstrate significant national differences in values and attitudes, our results show that, barring a few exceptions on certain issues, the official political

boundary between the two countries does not delineate the important cultural divisions or regional communities of North America. Instead, the key dividing lines seem to be the Mason-Dixon Line and the borders separating Quebec from all the other regions.

Such a provocative conclusion requires some concession and qualification, of course. First of all, our use of the term "North America" in this context clearly excludes some regions that would normally be considered part of the continent in conventional usage, most notably Mexico and the Hispanic countries of Central America. There seems little doubt that these countries, at a minimum, would form a fourth distinct region had we been able to include them.

A second qualification concerns our attitude measures, which represent a relatively wide but not comprehensive range of social and political value orientations. Additional research is required that explores other issues, including those that touch on respondents' reactions to the particular social and political systems in which they reside. Previous research has shown, for example, that Canadians and Americans are quite different from each other in such areas as religiosity (Bibby 1987; Lipset 1990) and trust in government (e.g., Baer et al. 1990a). Such differences may in part be attributable to the distinct religious and political institutions in the two countries. Hence, research involving measures that deal specifically with these and other institutional distinctions could provide additional insight into the problem of national and regional delineations.

A third concession has to do with the rather limited sample size available to us in this analysis, which restricted to some extent the number of regional categories that we were able to delineate in our assessment of possible regional divisions. A larger sample would have permitted us to test models involving finer and more numerous regional breakdowns, and might have led to the identification of additional or more detailed regional cultural distinctions than were revealed here. Nevertheless, despite this limitation, we believe the present analysis provides a useful starting point for tracing the continent's distinct regional communities, and for assessing the impact of these distinctions on the general Lipset thesis. Even with the restricted number of regional categories available to us, the findings cast considerable doubt on Lipset's observations concerning national-level value differences. At this early stage, the evidence seems clear. There is virtually no empirical basis for arguing that major value differences exist between Canadians and Americans as a whole, at least along the lines suggested by Lipset. There seem to be three distinguishable cultural communities that can be delineated, none of which is defined by the national boundary separating the two countries. These regions include a left-liberal Quebec, a relatively conservative U.S. Old South, and a comparatively moderate population residing everywhere else. It is interesting to note that, if the left-liberal Quebeckers and conservative U.S southerners are excluded from consideration, then the similarities between the remaining Canadian and American populations becomes more apparent than has already been indicated in previous research.

We contend that the findings reported here represent a fundamental challenge to Lipset's "origins" thesis for Canadian and American differences. According to that thesis, the American Revolution was the founding moment for both countries, the single occurrence that defined

the fundamental characters and belief systems of the two peoples right up to the present day. In our view, to point to any single event to explain the formation and development of Canada and the United States risks serious oversimplification. If pressed to do so, however, rather than look to the battlegrounds of the American Revolutionary War for the key historical events that forged the two nations, we would look elsewhere, probably to Gettysburg and the Plains of Abraham (e.g., Eccles 1972, p.204, 246-7; Foote 1989, p.138; Reed 1982, p.167, 1983, pp.24, 54, 85; Rioux 1978).

Given Lipset's work on the subject, it may be surprising to find that both Quebec and the Old South of the United States stand out as relatively discrete elements in the cultural map of North America. Apart from a brief acknowledgement of Quebec as a special case in his more recent writings, Lipset does not treat these two regions as distinct entities when analysing value differences in the two countries. As it turns out, however, both regions are culturally distinguishable from the rest of the continent. Moreover, there are several obvious parallels between the two regions that may make their distinctiveness from other regions less than surprising.

For example, both Quebec and the Old South are regions that experienced and came to be defined by important military defeats. Partly as a result of these defeats, both regions suffered prolonged periods of economic and political subordination and, until recently, both remained isolated socially and culturally from what might be termed the North American "mainstream." As the work of some historians implies, both Quebec and the Old South could be said to have existed as quasi-"feudal" fragments in the midst of modernizing, "bourgeois" influences developing elsewhere on the continent (cf. Hartz 1955, pp.145-8; Horowitz 1966). Even now, people in the two regions seem at times to feel besieged or manipulated by powerful others operating elsewhere in their respective countries. Finally, both Quebeckers and U.S. southerners also seem to perceive themselves as different in important ways from their fellow citizens and probably cultivate and take comfort in these differences.

Of course, one crucial divergence, despite these parallels, is that Quebeckers have apparently evolved into the most consistently left-liberal population in the two countries while Americans living in the Old South seem to be the most conservative regional community on the continent. Identifying the reasons for this divergence would require an extensive analysis that goes well beyond the scope of this paper. It seems likely, though, that the explanation must be traced to a complex of distinct historical events and social developments occurring in the two regions over the past century or more. One speculation is that, had we been able to compare Quebec and the U.S. Old South fifty years ago, we may have found greater similarity in attitudes and values in the two groups than seems to exist now. This observation is based on the commonly held assumption that Quebec was a very conservative society prior to the major social, economic, and political changes that occurred after World War II. Since then, Quebec has experienced considerable liberalization, especially during the Quiet Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast, at about the same time, the Deep South of the United States was still clinging to its old institutions, most obviously in its resistance to the drive for racial desegregation and black civil rights.

A principal goal of this analysis was to assess different ways of modelling the regions of Canada and the United States, and to explore alternatives to the conventional categories used by most researchers in the two countries. In particular, we examined the degree to which proximity along the boundary separating the two nations might produce more within-country than between-country differences in values and attitudes. Partly because of limitations in the data, our results in this regard are not conclusive. We have found some evidence of similarities between the contiguous regions arrayed along the border, but these affinities are not sufficient to conclude that proximity, either north to south or east to west, is an overriding influence in defining regional cultures. At the same time, however, the preliminary proximity model tested here does fit the data reasonably well, and represents an improvement on both Lipset's two-nations distinction and its three-category variant (English Canada-Quebec-United States). Nevertheless, until additional research can be conducted on the problem, it would be prudent to assume that factors other than geographic proximity are more important for generating the similarities in attitudes and values we have found among most Canadians and Americans. Both the use of the same language in the two countries and exposure to essentially the same (largely American) mass media and popular culture are factors that are presumably more significant.[16]

One secondary finding of note is that, contrary to some initial expectations, Albertans are not very different from the residents of Manitoba or Saskatchewan, at least on most of the issue areas addressed in this analysis. This result suggests that the conventional strategy of combining these three provinces into a single Prairie Provinces category has some justification. Although it is true that, historically, the more socialist New Democratic Party has enjoyed greater electoral success in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, while more right-wing parties like Social Credit and the Progressive Conservatives have succeeded in Alberta, this pattern need not reflect major ideological differences among the people of these areas themselves. In fact, as some observers have suggested, the differences in electoral patterns may be largely the result of voters' sharing an essentially similar reformist or populist ideology in all three provinces, but also having a different perception of which party in each province best represents this ideology (e.g., Irving 1948; Sinclair 1973; for discussion, see Clark 1989, pp.402-7; Clark et al. 1975, pp.179-85).

Some of the results reported here could have implications for a recent debate among historians and other social scientists over the utility of the national state or nation-state as a unit of empirical investigation (e.g., Clark forthcoming; Tilly 1990; Watkins 1990). Our finding that, in terms of culture and values, there are few national differences between Canada and the United States <u>per se</u> lends some credence to the view that national states are becoming increasingly similar, so much so that there is little justification for analysing them as separate entities. However, it is also possible that the situation involving Canada and the United States is a special case, and not generalizable to the analysis of nations in Western Europe and elsewhere. As Lipset himself at times has conceded, and as the results reported here clearly suggest, Canada and the United States share an unusually large number of cultural and other similarities, probably moreso than any other two countries on earth. Therefore, to the extent

that the Canadian-American situation is rare, even unique, it may not serve as an appropriate example of a general decline in the distinctiveness of national states. At the same time, it seems to us that additional analyses of cross-national differences in attitudes and values, conducted along the lines pursued in this paper but involving many more countries, could provide a useful means of assessing this question.

One of the major questions that has not been resolved by the present analysis is what classification of regions should be used in future studies of regional culture in North America. This question requires considerably more research before any definitive answer can be attempted. It is important to recognize, of course, that the choice of any classification of regions should not be made without regard to explanatory or theoretical issues. The choice should be informed by an understanding of the basis for the emergence and consolidation of regional distinctiveness. Hence, while the acceptance of obvious or commonly held geographical breakdowns in both nations is understandable in some respects, it could preclude a systematic assessment of what the most appropriate categorizations should be. As a result, explanations for regional differences may assume the adequacy of a classification, when this classification should itself be the subject of analytical and empirical assessment.

At the most general level, explanations for regional differentiation usually rely on a structural difference model that, though useful, is typically insensitive to process, as well as to the problems associated with the complex relations among structure, culture, and behavior. Such models identify structural differentiation along economic, political, ecological, or social lines in order to explain cultural, attitudinal or behavioral differences. Ideally, a structural explanation should be supplemented with an appreciation of historical factors that have influenced the development of distinct regions. A prime example is the cultural or ethnic heritage of the earliest settlers and of subsequent migrants to the area in question. At the same time, more analysis is required in which the early patterns of regional differentiation are not seen as immutable but, instead, are understood as subject to alteration over time. In other words, as an emergent property of individual interaction and social systems, cultures are subject to the continual impact of events and social processes that lie outside them. This is especially true for the political aspects of culture, which are intimately bound up with the current experiences and interests of the inhabitants of particular regions. While it is clear that, in any given region at any given time, some culture must be in place, it is important to realize that this culture will also be continually re-articulated. From this perspective, regionalism is a variable phenomenon, which fluctuates and evolves with historical processes, shifting conceptions of needs and interests, and changing the political alignments arising from contemporary events.

Recently Brym (1989a) has identified a paradigm shift in Canadian sociology, involving a reorientation away from concerns with culture and toward an interest in power and conflict. The shift is partially explicable as an outcome of an increasing distancing of Canadian sociology from its American counterpart. When we examine the explanations that have been advanced in the two countries for the regional phenomenon, we find evidence of this shift. In Canada, most

recent explanations derive from a dependency perspective, in which the unequal power relations that accompany uneven development are the cause of regional differentiation (Clement 1978; Bell and Tepperman 1979; Matthews 1989; Gidengil 1989). In contrast, American studies of regionalism focus on the emergence of political culture, which is understood to be largely a consequence of either the degree of modernity of the region (Gastil 1975; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) or specific events and structural differentiation (Reed 1982; Lowery and Sigelman 1982; Patterson 1968; and Sharkansky 1970). Issues of power, interests, and the conflicts that these engender receive little attention. While the dependency perspective is subject to criticism on other grounds (e.g., Allahar 1989; Brym 1989b), we concur with its contention that issues of power, interests, and perceptions of inequality or injustice are at the center of contemporary manifestations of regional distinctiveness. It now remains for additional analyses to be conducted, in which issues of power and conflict are more explicitly included in the modelling of regional cultures and communities.

END NOTES

1. We thank Samuel Clark, Neil Guppy, and Richard Henshel for their helpful comments and suggestions. The order of authors is alphabetical. Direct all correspondence to: Edward Grabb, Department of Sociology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5C2.

2. Lipset's essential premise, that there are clear and fundamentally distinct national cultures in both Canada and the United States, in itself acts as an important obstacle to his identification of separate regional cultures in the two countries.

3. In fact, there are three different versions of the U.S. Census classification currently in use. Depending on the purposes and preferences of the researcher in question, the Census scheme allows for four, five, or nine regional groupings. The simple four-category scheme involves the Northeast, the South, the Midwest and the West. The five-category version is similar, except that the South is divided into the Border South and the Solid South. The nine-category scheme subdivides the original four regions as follows: the North is divided into New England and the Middle Atlantic; the Midwest is divided into East North Central, and West North Central; the South is broken down into the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central; and the West is divided into the Mountain and Pacific regions.

4. The data for the Class Structure and Class Consciousness Merged Multi-Nation file were originally collected by Erik Olin Wright and associates. Neither the collector of the original data nor the disseminating archive (I.C.P.S.R.) bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

5. In our initial deliberations, we considered some other subdivisions of the conventional categories, including the separation of Newfoundland from the other Atlantic Provinces. Unfortunately, sample size limitations precluded any finer delineations of this sort. We should also note that residents of the Yukon and the Northwest Territories were excluded from the sampling frame of the original survey, which prevented the use of the North as an additional category.

6. Alaska and Hawaii were excluded from the sampling frame of the original survey, and so could not be part of the present analysis.

7. The small sample size for the U.S. North West region makes some comparisons involving that group tentative. The small sample properties of latent variable models are not well known, so that significance tests involving this group should be treated with some caution. It might be advisable, for example, to require a higher level of significance before declaring results to be significant.

8. We can also note that, in preliminary work, we performed additional analyses for comparative purposes, using the five-category U.S. Census approach. The major findings parallel those presented here using Odum's approach. Because of the several advantages of the Odum scheme, and to preserve space, only the results using the Odum classification are reported. Findings using the Census categories are available on request.

9. Because much of the literature dealing with regional and national differences in Canada and the United States speaks in descriptive rather than causal terms, some might question whether the use of statistical controls in this analysis is appropriate. In our view, such controlled comparisons are necessary and useful. As some prominent Canadian scholars have contended (e.g., Simeon 1975), region can be viewed as an envelope or receptacle, containing a collection of the causal effects of income, education, rural-urban distribution, and other structural variables. From this perspective, controlling for structural differences is useful to help account for or explain whatever regional differences in culture and values are evident at the bivariate level of analysis. Other scholars assert the causal independence of structural differences from region per se. They see region, or more precisely regional culture, as a causal influence in itself, and argue that regional differences are not simply an effect or consequence of structural variations across regions. If the latter view is correct, then regional differences should remain strong in spite of any controls on structural factors. In either event, it is important in the present analysis to examine regional differences, both before and after controls on other variables.

10. This indicator of size of residence is obviously not a perfect gauge of respondent's current community size. Nevertheless, to the extent that people's values and beliefs are often established relatively early in the life course, size of residence at age 16 might actually be a better measure for our purposes than size of current residence. In any case, because this was the only measure of rural-urban residence available in the survey, we chose to include it. The alternative would have been to have no rural-urban control of any kind.

11. An inspection of the modification indices associated with each of the twelve regions indicates that there are no instances in which the addition of any correlated error term would substantially improve the fit across all regions. In a number of instances, adding correlated error terms in individual regions would result in improvements in fit, but such terms have not been added because of: (1) the problem of a posteriori interpretation, (2) the likelihood that at least some of these terms might result from capitalizing on chance, especially given the expectation that the imperfections of fit are exaggerated when data are not normally distributed, and (3) the usefulness of keeping the ratio of the number of free parameters to the number of cases within reasonable bounds (see Bentler and Chow 1987).

12. In a model with the factor pattern matrices no longer constrained to equality, the new Goodness of Fit Indices would be: Ontario .963, Quebec .944, Atlantic Provinces .904, Manitoba/Saskatchewan .915, Alberta .906, British Columbia .908, U.S. Far West .892, U.S. North West .803, U.S. Middle .937, U.S. North East .922, U.S. South West .873, U.S. Old South .931.

13. The coefficient for the U.S. North West (.236) is not significantly different from zero, which is the value for the reference category (Ontario). It is larger than the coefficient for the U.S. Middle, but we would be even less likely to declare the U.S. North West to be

significantly different from the U.S. Middle, because of its standard error. The small sample in the U.S. North West (N=49) makes a definitive test in either direction difficult.

14. The chi-square value for Model VI in Table 3 was calculated before the addition of this last parameter. With the last paramater added, the chi-square difference increases from 298.08 (df=14) to 323.42 (df=15).

15. All t-values reported in this section involve estimates of the significance of the difference between a model with a pooled coefficient, with equality constraints imposed across all groups, and a model where the coefficient associated with a particular region is estimated separately. They are based on modification index tests, which are approximate but tend, if anything, to understate effects. These are not tests that determine if the coefficient for a particular region is significantly different from zero.

16. One difference between Canadians and Americans that seems undeniable is the considerably greater Canadian interest in the whole question of comparing value systems in the two nations. This difference undoubtedly accounts for the contrasting fates of the "Hartz-Horowitz" thesis in the two countries (Hartz 1955; Horowitz 1966). As Forbes (1987) has observed, Hartz's analysis has had little impact on American political science, while Horowitz's work has been the subject of intensive discussion in Canada. The two scholars agreed with the proposition that colonial political cultures are forged out of European fragments, but both men differed in their characterizations of the differences among the English Canadian, French Canadian, and American publics. Horowitz suggested that English Canadians should be relatively conservative, making them different from Americans and more like French Canadians. Hartz believed that English Canadians should be relatively liberal, making them similar to Americans and unlike French Canadians. Our results indicate that Horowitz was wrong in both respects, while Hartz was correct about the form of the differences but incorrect about the substance. English Canadians are more like Americans, but largely because both of these groups are less liberal than French Canadians.

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